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FINNIS ON LONERGAN: A REFLECTION
FREDERICK G. LAWRENCE*

I

am grateful to Professor Patrick Brennan and the others who planned
this tribute for inviting me to say something about the work of the esteemed legal and moral philosopher, John Finnis. He is an author to be
taken seriously. As a Roman Catholic thinker, he has chosen to write
books and articles on the theme of what Aristotle called “what is right by
nature” (physei dikaion). A few years ago I was invited to teach a course on
diverse approaches to jurisprudence to the Federal Court judges of the
U.S. Sixth Circuit on Mackinaw Island. When I came to the section on
Natural Law, a judge sitting in the back of the room stage-whispered, “Why
do only Catholics know about the natural law?” I would say that anyone
wondering about what is right by nature, as well as how it stands to reason,
must grapple with Finnis’s magnum opus, Natural Law and Natural Right.1 I
agree with my late colleague, Fr. Ernest Fortin’s opinion of that work in
the conclusion to his critical discussion of it:
Suffice it to say that . . . in scope and depth it surpasses anything
that has yet been produced by a Roman Catholic scholar in our
generation. In an age that has virtually given up on the possibility of establishing any kind of moral standard, let alone the highest, it fully deserves the enthusiasm with which it has been
greeted, and more. . . .2
Here I will confine my remarks to Fundamentals of Ethics because in it John
Finnis discussed at some length ideas of my chief mentor, Bernard Lonergan. I will focus on Finnis’s respectful disagreements with Lonergan.
I have no idea know how much time John Finnis has given to Lonergan. That he has spoken knowledgeably about both Insight and Method in
Theology, and pointed readers towards the first edition in book form of his
articles on gratia operans, Grace and Freedom,3 suggests that his familiarity
with Lonergan is more than superficial.
* Theology Department, Boston College.
1. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHT (H. L. A. Hart ed., 1980).
2. Ernest L. Fortin, The New Rights Theory and the Natural Law, in CLASSICAL
CHRISTIANITY AND THE POLITICAL ORDER: REFLECTIONS ON THE THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL PROBLEM 265, 279 (J. Brian Benestad ed., 1996). Something similar may be
affirmed, mutatis mutandis, of his other worthwhile books with which I have some
familiarity and which I have not fully mastered: see JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF
ETHICS (1983), and the contribution to Oxford University Press’s Founders of
Modern Political and Social Thought, JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL,
AND LEGAL THEORY (1998).
3. See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 413.
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As a Lonergan scholar, I am truly grateful that John Finnis has respectfully referred his readers to the work of the Canadian Jesuit, even
though he has not fully agreed with him. I have the impression that what
Finnis and Lonergan share is far greater than what separates them. He
has accorded Lonergan an appreciation of strong points even while criticizing some of his positions.
I. BACKGROUND AFFINITIES
John Finnis’s field is legal philosophy or jurisprudence and philosophical ethics, while the lion’s share of Lonergan’s scholarly life as a theologian was devoted to what he called ‘foundational methodology,’4 in
which he was engaged with the intellectual probity of Catholic theology in
light of the challenges presented by both modern science and modern
historical consciousness. As a Roman Catholic philosopher, Finnis has
ever been open to the higher viewpoint5 provided by revealed belief, and
his work tends to embody the relevance of the metaphor (in Pope John
Paul II’s Encyclical Fides et Ratio) of the two complementary wings of reason and faith.
Finnis’s arguments are perspicuous, concise, and coherent, and they
adhere as rigorously as possible to the logical ideal of science. The formulator of that ideal, Aristotle, analyzed the human being as a synholon—a
potentially integrated whole made up of intelligibly ordered organic,
psychic, and rational or spiritual parts, and so a being that possesses the
nature of an intelligible, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible principle
of motion and of rest. In order to do justice to this reality, and to show
that the human being exists within a cosmos that exhibits a similar intelligibly ordered integrity, Finnis moved spontaneously and persuasively towards a higher viewpoint whose intelligibility is not logically deducible
from the vantage of the terms and relations of lower viewpoints.6 This is
especially clear in his refutations of skepticism,7 utilitarianism, and socalled “proportionalism” or “consequentialism.”8 As regards the latter refutations, the notion of a higher viewpoint regarding human beings and
their moral acts enters implicitly into all that Finnis argued as regards the
incommensurability of diverse ends or of means in relation to ends. The
same notion is also implicit in the use Finnis made, passim, of the “experi4. See BERNARD LONERGAN, Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon, in 17 COLWORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PAPERS
1965–1980 395 (Robert C. Croken & Robert M. Doran eds., 2004); see also BERNARD
LONERGAN, Lecture 1: Philosophy of God, supra, at 162, 174, 176; BERNARD LONERGAN,
Variations in Fundamental Theology, supra, at 240, 246–47.
5. See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 21–22. Finnis makes favorable reference to
Lonergan’s notion in Insight of “higher viewpoint” in the Notes to Chapter II:
“Images and Rejections.” Id.
6. See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 371–414;
FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS, supra note 2, at 136–53.
7. FINNIS, supra note 2, at 56–79.
8. See id. at 80–108.
LECTED
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ence machine” invented by Robert Nozick for thought-experiments in opposition to reductionist positions in ethics.9
For Finnis, then, the human being’s intentional action emerges from
both the integral human being’s organic (or bodily) level and its psychic
substrate (that encompasses the reciprocal mediation of feelings and the
free images proper to the higher primates) in both practical intelligence
and practical reasonableness. In this way Finnis has provided a philosophic approximation of what Jewish and Christian revelation has spoken
of as original justice or righteousness, in which feelings or emotions are
under the control of reason, and reason is subordinated ultimately to God.
It is clear that as a philosopher he has an acute sense of the limitations of
what has traditionally been called “unaided reason” or “reason unillumined by faith”; and as a thinker in search of common ground, he has
made his case for natural law sive natural rights in terms that are accessible
to non-believers in principle. I think the final chapters of both Fundamentals and Natural Law and Natural Rights would seem to confirm that he
basically agrees with the presupposition that structured the unfolding of
what Lonergan called the moving viewpoint in Insight, namely, the distinction between self-reliant intelligence and the possibility, if not the exigency, of its being transformed into an intellectus quaerens fidem
(understanding seeking faith).
A passage from Lonergan’s essay, “Cognitional Structure” summarizes
the affinities between Finnis and Lonergan:
It is quite true that objective knowing is not yet authentic human
living; but without objective knowing there is no authentic living;
for one knows objectively just in so far as one is neither unperceptive, nor stupid, nor silly; and one does not live authentically inasmuch as one is either imperceptive or stupid or silly. . . .
To treat people as persons one must know and one must invite
them to know. A real exclusion of objective knowing, so far from
promoting, only destroys personalist values.10
II. DIVERSE EMPHASES REGARDING PRACTICAL REASONING
In a principled and reasoned manner, John Finnis’s work opposed
the moral philosophy of David Hume and his followers, who reduce morality to the ex post facto rationalization of emotions or feelings, desires or
wants in a sense that provides no basis for normativity. Consequently he
took a dim view not only of Anthony Kenny’s use of “wants” in his rendition of Aristotle’s thought, but also of all the neo-scholastics who put the
9. See id. at 37–42; see also id. at 158 (Index under “experience machine”).
Finnis also referred to Lonergan’s reprise of the psychological-metaphysical
method of Aristotle and Aquinas of moving from the correlation of objects and
psychological acts to habits and ranges of potencies, to kinds of soul. Id.
10. See BERNARD LONERGAN, Cognitional Structure, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF
BERNARD LONERGAN, supra note 4, at 220–21.
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stress on the modum inclinationis instead of the modum cognitionis of
Thomas Aquinas’s well-known twofold way of judging [Sum. theol., I, q. 1, a.
6, ad 3m]. He also objected to “the line that runs from phenomenologists
such as Brentano and Scheler through to the late works of Bernard Lonergan, in which we are said to ‘apprehend’ value ‘in feelings’, so that ‘apprehension of values and disvalues is the task not of understanding but of
intentional response’ i.e. of ‘sensibility’ and ‘feelings’, ‘feelings [which]
reveal their objects’”.11
While I agree that Lonergan’s expressions cited here are ambiguous
vis-à-vis the empiricist hedonism to which Finnis thought that Lonergan
exposed himself, I do not think Finnis has accurately understood Lonergan’s meaning, and so he portrayed Lonergan’s position as a dangerous
alternative to his own. I suspect that this misunderstanding is due in large
part to a profound contrast in emphasis between Lonergan’s overall approach to ethics and values and Finnis’s overall approach to practical
reasoning.
Perhaps it is not unfair to note the influence of contemporary analytic
philosophy on Finnis’s approach, in so far as, despite its evident roots in
the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas, unlike them, Finnis treated
moral philosophy in terms of what he called “the logic of practical reasoning.” Moreover, in order to combat the overall skepticism about moral
standards and the relativism that is ever more common in moral philosophy and theology today, he understandably stressed epistemological issues
pertaining to the relationship between ethics and the issue of truth in his
account of “practical reasonableness”.
I believe Lonergan’s approach to ethics is more like that of HansGeorg Gadamer (whose ‘hermeneutic’ angle depended on Plato and Aristotle), and of both Herbert McCabe and Alasdair MacIntyre (who helped
revive a non-scholastic version of Thomas Aquinas’s ethics of virtue and
character). These authors paid more attention to issues surrounding the
development of morality and hence to the dynamics of ongoing social and
cultural traditions that promote virtue and practical wisdom. As modern
authors, none of them are innocent of logical and epistemological concerns, and yet their respective retrievals of Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas to
meet today’s issues are marked by concern with the community’s role in
the attainment of moral character. This led them to place greater emphasis
upon the educational dimension of ethics. Thus, agreeing with Aristotle,
Gadamer stressed that first principles are less relevant in the sphere of
practical philosophy than “the understanding people always possess of
themselves and of living together already.”12 Herbert McCabe constantly
underlined how practical reasoning has far less to do with the logical infer11. FINNIS, supra note 2, at 32 (discussing neo-scholastics, phenomenologists,
and Lonergan); id. at 30–31 (discussing Kenny). See also footnote 16 infra on Finnis’s AQUINAS, a work with which Fr. Fortin was not familiar.
12. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Aristoteles und die imperativische Ethik, GRIECHISCHE
PHILOSOPHIE 385 (1985).
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ences appropriate in theoretical knowledge than with the fact that the authentic human being emerges within a community which itself functions
as the concrete premise for ethical insight and judgment, and which he
claimed “is . . . the principle in virtue of which there is any syllogism at
all.”13 As Aristotle said, “As a man is, so does his end appear to him.”14
And so the possibility of discovering what is right depends on the sort of
person one is beforehand due to her or his prior upbringing, education,
and way of life.15 Just as the preferential or deliberative choice for Aristotle must not only be in accord with wish but requires a virtuous state of
character, so that belief about the good can only be true if one has the
combination of ethical and intellectual virtues presupposed by practical
wisdom (phronesis),16 Gadamer held that Aristotle’s “analysis of phronesis
recognizes that moral knowledge is a way of moral being itself, which
therefore cannot be considered apart from the whole concretion of what
he calls éthos.”17
Lonergan himself said of the almost question-begging empiricism of
the Ethics that when Aristotle wrote, “Virtue . . . is a state of character
concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this
being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which
the man of practical reason would determine it,” he was “refusing to speak
of ethics apart from the ethical reality of good men, of justice apart from
men that are just, of temperance apart from men that are temperate, of
the nature of virtue apart from the judgment of the man that possesses
practical wisdom.”18 I believe, therefore, that Lonergan never underestimated the importance of Aristotle’s typical appeal to the standard (kanôn)
or measure (metron) concretely embodied in the person who is morally
serious (spoudaios) or decent (epieikçs) in his ethical reflections. As both
McCabe and MacIntyre have shown, much of Aristotle’s approach was in13. See Herbert McCabe, Aquinas on Good Sense, in GOD STILL MATTERS 160
(Brian Davies ed., 2002).
14. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.
15. Colleague Patrick H. Byrne kindly pointed out to me the point made in a
typescript by C.D.C. Reeve, “Aristotle’s Philosophical Method,” in the following at
pages 30–31: “Since euphuia is what enables people ‘to discern (krinousi) correctly
what is best by a correct love or hatred of what is set before them’ (Top. VIII 14,
163b 15–16), it seems to be the power philosophy has and dialectic lacks. Since it
aims to achieve ‘what is best,’ it seems to be the sort of euphuia referred to in the
following passage:
A person doesn’t aim at the end [the good] through his own choice; rather,
he must by nature have a sort of natural eye to make him discern (krinei) well and
choose what is really good. And the person who by nature has this eye in good
condition is euphuês. For it is the greatest and finest thing. . . and when it is naturally good and fine, it is true and complete euphuia (NICOMACHEAN ETHICS III 5
1114b 5–12).
16. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III 5 1114b 21–25, VI 12 1144a
29–36, VII 8 1151 17–19.
17. Gadamer, supra note 12, at 387.
18. See Bernard Lonergan, The Subject, in A SECOND COLLECTION 82 (William J.
Ryan & Bernard J. Tyrrell eds., 1974).
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corporated into the moral philosophy of Aquinas, which was always the
background assumption for Lonergan’s thought on the most important
issues with which he dealt.
Two of Ernest Fortin’s comments may be salient here. First, although
Finnis claimed in Foundations that he did not question “the existence or
the psychological importance of feelings, emotions, inclinations, desires,
qua felt wants, etc.,” even in the much longer Natural Law and Natural
Rights, he seemed to disagree with Aquinas’s statement that “Natural inclinations can be best known in matters that are naturally done without the
deliberation of reason; for thus each one acts in his nature as he is apt by
birth to act.”19 I would add that in Fundamentals of Ethics as well, Finnis
seemed to have at least underemphasized the possibly relevant cognitive
role of emotions, inclinations, appetites, and passions in reference to
Aquinas [Sum. theol., I–II, q. 94, a. 2, and I, q. 60, a. 5 and quoting from
Quodlibetum I.4.8 as below].20
Second, in remarking that there was “so little talk about virtue” in
Natural Law and Natural Rights,21 Fortin thought that Finnis did not assume for his argument the concrete indispensability of virtues for moral
philosophy or practical reasoning. Finnis would never discount virtue, but
although the topic is mentioned in Fundamentals and discussed in its final
chapter under the heading of the lasting effects of human decisions, virtue
is certainly not a prominent theme in that shorter work, either. As a result—in contrast to the approaches of Gadamer, McCabe, and Fortin—
Finnis’s main arguments regarding the nature of practical intelligence
and reasonableness prescind from the necessary conditioning by practical
wisdom, prudence, or phronesis.
In treating practical wisdom’s centrality for Aquinas’s moral philosophy, Herbert McCabe contrasted the legalistic moral philosophy of “conventional” scholasticism with the openness and virtue-based flexibility of
Aquinas’s idea of prudentia. Following Jane Austin, he liked to translate
prudentia as ‘good sense’ in order to avoid the connotations of clever opportunism associated with the word “prudence” in English discourse. He
believed good sense or practical wisdom was much more significant for
Thomas Aquinas than either rules or the natural law.22
19. “Inclinationes naturales maxime cognosci possunt in his quae naturaliter
aguntur absque rationis deliberatione; sic enim agit unumquodque in natura sicut aptum natum est agi.” (Italics added by Fr. Fortin). See also AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 72–78 in which Finnis does provide a full
and balanced treatment of this dimension of Thomas’s teaching (III, 4: “Reason’s
Civil Rule Over Emotions”). Fr. Fortin did not see this book.
20. See Fortin, supra note 2, at 269; Lonergan supra note 18, at 280.
21. See Fortin, supra note 2, at 270–71.
22. See Herbert McCabe, Prudentia, in ON AQUINAS 101–14 (Brian Davies ed.,
2008), where the author always makes clear the overlap between prudence as a
natural virtue and prudence as “a sharing in divine providentia by which we are
guided in life of caritas (sharing in divine love).” Id. at 103.
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What gives McCabe’s overall account of practical reasoning such a
different flavor or emphasis from Finnis’s is that, unlike the conventional
scholasticism of which he too was so critical, his account was based on the
difference that writing the Commentary on Aristotle’s de Anima made for
Aquinas’s treatments in the Secunda Pars and the de Malo of the relationships between intellect and will in human action. In his Aquinas, it is clear
that Finnis also has a profound sense of the complex interactions between
intellect and will in human action as displayed in the diagrams in JeanMarc Laporte’s, Patience and Power.23 Finnis characteristically emphasizes
the primacy of intellect in his treatment of Aquinas, whereas McCabe’s
rendering of the thrust of what Thomas learned from the close study of
Aristotle tries to underplay any too great separation between intellect and
will, so that, as the latter wrote, “when we come to the field of human
action there is no operation of the reason which is not also an operation
of the will, and vice-versa. There is an interweaving of understanding and
being attracted that cannot be unraveled in practice. We think of what we
are attracted to thinking of, and we are attracted to what we think of.” As a
result, if we ask Aquinas whether “‘intending’ or ‘deciding’ or whatever” is
“an act of intellect or will,” the answer will regularly be, “Both, but one
predominantly.”24 McCabe’s simplified schema of the interplay of intellect and will for the sake of decision and action exhibits his way of interpreting the interplay or virtual concomitance: “We aim at some end (we
find it attractive). We decide on the means to attain it (and on the particular means that we want to use). We act.”
According to Frederick E. Crowe’s less scaled-down schematization of
Aquinas, intentio involves a judgment of ends from which there proceeds
from the intellect into the will—as something the will as a rational appetite undergoes or suffers (a pati)—an act of will consenting to the ends
(velle) without any free action on the part of the will.25 This actuation of
the will that does not involve free decision has to occur in order to set the
stage for the operation of deliberation (consilium). As McCabe said, glossing Summa theologiae I–II, q. 56, a. 3: “a man needs to be properly disposed
in respect of the reasons for which he is acting, which are his aims: ad
principia huius rationis agendorum, quae sunt fines.” Deliberation concerns
means or courses of action that accord with, or are in harmony with the
ends, so that decision (electio) can freely occur.
I agree with Finnis’s disagreement with interpreters of Aristotle’s
thought who hold that one can only deliberate about means and not
23. See also JEAN-MARC LAPORTE, PATIENCE AND POWER (1988), a book derived
from Laporte’s 1958 Université de Montréal in 1958 M.A. thesis, The Interplay of the
Intellect and the Will in the Moral Act according to Thomas Aquinas.
24. See Herbert McCabe, Action, Deliberation, and Decision, in ON AQUINAS,
supra note 22, at 79–80.
25. See the section, Framework for Discussion: The Duplex Via, in Frederick E.
Crowe, COMPLACENCY AND CONCERN IN THE THOUGHT OF ST. THOMAS, 73–203,
81–91.
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about ends. This seems plausible both because the ability to discern the
“that-for-the-sake-of-which” people make decisions and take action seems
to be presupposed by Aristotle’s reflections in Nicomachean Ethics on the
three chief options about the meaning of eudaimonia, happiness, or flourishing; and because people regularly judge and intend ends other than
those regarding the highest good. In a similar vein, (with which Finnis
probably would not disagree, even though he did not make it so explicit in
his concern to do justice to the complexity of Aquinas’s teaching) McCabe
was right to say that for Aquinas both deliberation (consilium) and decision
(electio) “are the work of human reason and concomitantly of the will (the
human capacity to be attracted by what is [judged] to be good),” and that
each involves a different kind of reasoning. Stated in terms that McCabe
admitted to be over-simplified, “deliberation is about possible means to my
end; decision is about whether I shall take these means.”26 Finnis probably
would not disagree with this nuance, but I do not think he made this point
as explicit.
Be that as it may, for Lonergan the two relevant questions in practical
reasoning are: What should I do? and, Should I do it? Clearly, both questions would have to be asked and answered in the light of one’s concrete
answer to the further overarching question, What is worthwhile? In a
manner that I did not see so clearly stated either by Finnis or by McCabe,
Gadamer observed about Aristotle’s phronesis that, while it is “the virtue
enabling one to hit upon the mean and achieve the concretization,”27 by
deliberating practical wisdom actually “determines the end itself for the
first time in its concreteness, through the concretion proper to moral deliberation, precisely as what is ‘to be done’ (as prakton agathon).”28 According to Gadamer, ethics cannot remain in the sphere of generalities, but
must always be a matter of the concrete facts of the situation (hekasta)
because, according to Aristotle, they are alethinoteroi, i.e., they have greater
truth content than universal precepts. That is why in ethical matters one
must have recourse not to books or moral codes, but to the spoudaioi, the
practically wise persons who are sufficiently mature to regularly desire
what is truly choice-worthy and so can judge each concrete matter correctly. The implication is that their judgment is not undermined by pleasure or disordered passions when they deliberate about what is truly good.
So Gadamer taught that the prior knowledge of the end (attributed
by Aquinas to synderesis) is something people have images of or a “feel
26. See McCabe, Deliberative Reasoning, in ON AQUINAS, supra note 22, at 87.
27. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Über die Möglichkeit einer philosophischen Ethik
(1963), in NEUERE PHILOSOPHIE, II, PROBLEME, GESTALTEN 184 (Mohr Siebeck
1999), translated in On the Possibility of a Philosophical Ethics (1963), HERMENEUTICS,
RELIGION, AND ETHICS 30 (Joel Weinsheimer trans., Yale Univ. Press 1999).
28. Gadamer (translated), supra note 27, at 30, but here my own perhaps
more literal translation of the sentence, “Sie bestimmt durch die Konkretion der sittlichen Überlegung den >Zweck< selbst erst in seiner Konkretion, nämlich als den >tunlichen< (als prakton agathon).” See Hans-Georg Gadamer, supra note 27, at 184.
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for”29 in the measure that they have been well brought up by everyday
praise and blame. As Alasdair MacIntyre also did, Gadamer stressed the
stories in light of which people live in their world mediated by meanings
and values. As a result of having been educated, socialized, and acculturated in any given family, society, and culture, they possess some sort of
commonsense apprehension of the end, usually in the form of an anticipated life-story. For Aristotle, what Gadamer and Aquinas call “application” is not a matter of subsuming a concrete case under a general rule in
a process parallel to the deduction of a conclusion from a general principle. Initially, people’s knowledge of the end is about something they are
attracted to and desire as good; as an intention, their consent to such an
end has the status of a velleity or wish. But such persons have to have
many additional insights into and make groups of concrete judgments regarding each new situation as it arises in order repeatedly to make each
decision or preferential choice (prohairesis) in the light of this intention,
and regularly to take action in order to realize this intention in the course
of a lifetime. Significantly, as they repeatedly discern the good to be concretely done, they gradually become capable of discerning ever more accurately what the end, hitherto apprehended only sketchily (en typo),
concretely involves.
Here we can realize how relevant Newman’s famous distinction between “notional” and “real” apprehension and assent is to what is at stake
in the development of the moral person. As Lonergan wrote:
[O]ne does well to turn to . . . Newman’s Grammar of Assent and,
specifically, to the passages in which he distinguishes notional apprehension from real apprehension, and notional assent from
real assent. For the barriers to enlightenment are merely notional apprehension and merely notional assent, when we are
content with understanding the general idea and give no more
than an esthetic response that it is indeed a fine idea. On the
other hand, the attainment of enlightenment is the attainment of
real apprehension, real assent, and the motivation to live out
what we have learnt.30
Newman exercised a deep influence upon Lonergan in his student years,
especially because he explained the illative sense by analogy with Aristotle’s idea of phronesis (or practical wisdom) as contra-distinct from either
episteme or techne.31 In a letter to Henry Wilberforce reporting on his progress with the Grammar of Assent, Newman wrote:
29. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Hermeneutic Relevance of Aristotle, in TRUTH
METHOD 320 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 1991).
30. See Bernard Lonergan, Pope John’s Intention, in A THIRD COLLECTION: PAPERS BY BERNARD LONERGAN 236 (Frederick E. Crowe, ed., 1985).
31. See JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, AN ESSAY IN AID OF A GRAMMAR OF ASSENT (I.T.
Ker ed., 1985). In the section on the nature of the illative sense, Newman discusses Aristotle’s concept of “phronesis or judgment.” Id. at 228–29.
AND
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I consider there is no such thing (in the province of facts) as a
perfect logical demonstration; there is always a margin of objection. . . . Yet on the other hand it is a paradox to say there is not
such a state of mind as certitude. . . . I think it is phronesis which
tells when to discard the logical imperfection and to assent to the
conclusion which ought to be drawn in order to demonstration,
but it is not quite. . . . but I am arguing against the principle that
phronesis is a higher sort of logic.32
In working out his idea of the illative sense, Newman generalized Aristotle’s notion of phronesis in Book VI of NE so as to embrace the human
achievement of real apprehension and assent:
Multitudes indeed I ought to succeed in persuading of its truth
without any force at all, because they and I start from the same
principles, and what is a proof to me is a proof to them; but if any
one starts from any other principle but ours, I have not the
power to change his principles, or the conclusion which he draws
from them, any more than I can make a crooked man straight.
Whether his mind will ever grow straight, whether I can do anything towards its becoming straight, whether he is not responsible, responsible to his Maker, for being mentally crooked, is
another matter; still the fact remains, that, in any inquiry about
things in the concrete, men differ from each other, not so much
in the soundness of their reasoning as in the principles which
govern its exercise, that those principles are of a personal character, that where there is no common measure of minds, there is
no common measure of arguments, and that the validity of proof
is determined, not by any scientific test, but by the illative
sense.33
There is a striking contrast between the tenor of Newman’s statement
here and Finnis’s logically oriented treatment of practical reasonableness.
I would like readers to appreciate the affinity between Newman’s and
Lonergan’s approaches overall. Finnis tends to stress conceptualization
and conceptual description in relation to practical intelligence, and to
place the accent on the capacity to infer or deduce what is good to have,
or get, or do, or be, from remote or intermediate principles in the exercise of practical reasonableness. A remarkable passage from the Oxford
Sermons illustrates Newman’s awareness of how remote the manner in
which people attain knowledge in significant matters is from a conceptualism that emphasizes concepts to the relative neglect of the understanding
from which concepts arise:
32. 24 LETTERS AND DIARIES OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN 104–05 (C.S. Dessain &
Thomas Gornall eds., 1973).
33. NEWMAN, supra note 31, at 265–66.
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The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on from
point to point, gaining one by some indication; another on a
probability; then availing itself of an association; then falling
back on some received law; next seizing on testimony; then committing itself to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory; and thus it makes progress not
unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt
hand, and firm foot, ascends how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by practice, rather than by rule, leaving
no track behind him, and unable to teach another.34
Again we find in the Grammar another example of affinity with Lonergan’s approach in Newman’s articulation of the shortcomings of too great
a dependence on logic as one moves from grasping the sufficiency of evidence for one’s judgments either of fact or of value to actually affirming,
asserting, or judging what is truly the case or what is truly good:
Thus in concrete reasonings we are in great measure thrown
back into that condition, from which logic proposed to rescue us.
We judge for ourselves, by our own lights, and on our own principles; and our criterion of truth is not so much the manipulation
of propositions, as the intellectual and moral character of the
person maintaining them, and the ultimate silent effect of his
arguments or conclusions upon our minds.35
This passage may cause readers of Insight to recall that Lonergan, in the
course of exhibiting the link between the rationality of judgment as
grounded upon reflective understanding and the element of responsibility
on the part of the person making the judgment, cites La Rochefoucauld
about the tendency of people to complain about their memory and not
about their judgment.
Now I hope these background contrasts can help me clarify how, although Lonergan’s emphases differ from those of Finnis, their ultimate
aims are closer than may at first be apparent.
III. LONERGAN

ON

JUDGMENTS

OF

FACT

In this section I want to review Lonergan’s account of coming to know
facts and values, without abandoning truth or truthfulness in either case.
On a first level Lonergan called experience we are empirically conscious: If
we are awake, we can sense (see, hear, smell, taste, touch) and imagine; so
knowing begins with the sensed or perceived or the imagined. We are also
34. JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, NEWMAN’S UNIVERSITY SERMONS. FIFTEEN SERMONS
PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 1826–43 257 (Soc’y for Promoting
Christian Knowledge 1970).
35. NEWMAN, supra note 31, at 196.
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implicitly aware of ourselves as awake, sensing, perceiving, or imagining.
Experience as empirical awareness attains both sense data (the seen,
heard, smelled, tasted, touched) and the data of its own conscious and
intentional operations. Then questions for understanding (What is it? Why?
How? What for?) promote us to a second level of consciousness, making us
intelligently conscious: So we inquire about what we have sensed or
imagined, and so long as we have done so we may have an insight or an act
of understanding. We feel it: “I’ve got it! (Eureka: Archimedes), “Aha!” So
we might ask “Why are so many corporations relinquishing traditional loyalties to their workers by discarding health and pension commitments?” If
and when insights occur, we understand. And this enables us to use language to express what we’ve understood in some formulation of a guess or
(in science or scholarship) a hypothesis. For instance, “Because it increases profits for CEOs and shareholders and makes companies more
competitive vis-à-vis countries like China, India, Mexico, etc., where workers are paid neither high salaries nor perks.”
What understanding grasps and formulates is a possibly relevant intelligibility. If we’re alert, we realize that we only have a possibly relevant answer to our question, so we need to check it out, and ask, Is it true? For
example, “Does decreasing health insurance and pensions really increase
profits and competitiveness?” Such questions for verification (Is it so? Is it
really the case?) promote us to a third level of consciousness by making us
rationally conscious: To answer these questions we reflect in order to confront
our guess or hypothesis with the evidence and to grasp whether it is sufficient to affirm that what we have understood and formulated is correct.
Thus, to take a different example, the U.S. went to war in Iraq on the
premise that Saddam Hussein possessed a store of WMD’s (atomic weapons, biological or chemical weapons). In time, former weapons inspector
David Kay went to Iraq after the fall of Baghdad to see whether such a
stock of WMDs really existed. This experience demonstrates how we have
to make sure that we are being responsible and not silly or precipitous
when by means of an indirect or reflective insight we verify whether there is
evidence sufficient to warrant the claim that our possibly relevant understanding of the issue actually covers the available data. If, after asking all
the pertinent questions, we grasp that the evidence is sufficient, then we
feel internally and rationally compelled to express this understanding in a
judgment: we make the affirmation, “It’s right!” or the denial, “It’s not
true!” or add some such qualification as, “It’s still only probable or only
possible!” Our judgments affirm or deny the truth: when the evidence is
rationally compelling, they assert that our possibly relevant answer is actually relevant.
Whenever we do this, we know that what we have understood is a fact.
By ‘fact’ is meant a verified possibility. Both the coming-to-know the fact
and the fact are contingent, which means that both the knowing and the
known are conditioned in the sense that each could have been otherwise.
But if the conditions both on the side of the knower and on the side of the
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known are actually fulfilled, i.e., just as a “matter of fact,” the fact is virtually unconditioned, which is true of everything except God, the only absolutely unconditioned fact. That’s why the late Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan could rightly say, “Everyone’s entitled to their own opinions,
but they’re not entitled to their own facts!”
IV. LONERGAN ON JUDGMENTS OF VALUE
STRUCTURE OF THE HUMAN GOOD

AND THE

When we turn now to Lonergan’s account of judgments of value,36 we
begin by stressing that he always distinguished between judgments of fact
and judgments of value simply because they respond to different kinds of
questions. We have already stated that one of the hallmarks of Lonergan’s
cognitional theory is its emphasis on the fact that direct and reflective acts
of understanding occur in response to questions. So the act of understanding comes as a “release to a tension” and therefore always involves an
emotional component. This is true even at the time of his writing Insight,
where there is practically no positive account of emotions or feelings.
Here we encounter one of the salient contrasts between the thought of
Finnis and of Lonergan. For Lonergan desire is not only significant, but it
has a normative role to play. I am speaking, of course, of the desire to
know, which Lonergan tends to qualify with adjectives such as pure, detached, unrestricted, and disinterested: “Among men’s many desires,” he
wrote, “there is one that is unique. It is the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. As other desire, it has its satisfaction.” He talks
about this desire as the eros of intelligence, as a notion of being as a
whole, and as the source of wonder, which is the root of human questing
and questioning. As such, given the right circumstances, it elicits the questions that promote a person from empirical to intelligent, from intelligent
to reasonable, and from reasonable to responsible or existential consciousness. It is the cause of the reality meant by one of Lonergan’s favorite and
most often used phrases, namely, further questions, or further relevant or
pertinent questions. Now isn’t it the case that we are aware of wonder and
of questions of any and every type through feelings? And that the feelings
connected with the desire to know include satisfactions? I judge they are.
Feelings of this sort do not necessarily connote the disorder and reductivism that Finnis’s account of Lonergan fears may be associated with them.
In life we have to satisfy the felt demands of rational consciousness on the
level of fact and the felt demands of rational self-consciousness on the
level of value in order to know and be in loving union with the universe of
being.
In Insight, then, judgments of value involved the need for the consistency between our knowing and our doing. To be sure, Insight stressed the
three levels of the good: particular goods, good of order, and terminal
36. See BRIAN CRONIN, VALUE ETHICS: A LONERGAN PERSPECTIVE (2006) for a
reliable and fairly comprehensive account of Lonergan on values.
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value. We treat the first two now, and terminal values a bit later. So particular goods satisfy wants and desires; the good of order “is a formal intelligibility that is to be discovered only by raising questions, grasped only
through accumulating insights, formulated only in conceptions,” and,
Lonergan went on to say, “lies totally outside the field of sensitive appetition,” and yet “is in itself an object of human devotion.”37 Finnis failed to
note—and it must be conceded that Lonergan himself does not make this
altogether clear either in Insight or in Method in Theology—that among the
desires and wants that might require satisfaction would be a desire for
wisdom or the desire to know God as God is in God’s self (a natural desire
for a supernatural fulfillment). However, in relation to a discussion of
functional specialization in Method Lonergan observed that “ends proper
to particular levels may become the objective sought by operations on all
four levels.”38 So I think it correct to say that when Lonergan spoke of
people operating and cooperating to achieve any particular good, he
meant that they do so not only with their empirical consciousness, but also
with their awareness as intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. In what
follows, I hope it becomes more clear how this is so.
Already in Insight Lonergan distinguished between originating values
(subjects as choosers and as undergoing the intransitive effects of their
choices) and terminal values as possible objects of choice. “Objects of desire are values only inasmuch as they fall under some intelligible order”
since choice is an act of will, and “the will is intellectual appetite that regards directly only the intelligible good.”39 Again, “within terminal values
themselves there is a hierarchy: for each is an intelligible order, but some
of these orders include others, some are conditioning and others conditioned, some conditions are more general and others less.”40 What Finnis
speaks of as determining the good to be aimed at in action, Lonergan
speaks of in terms of the objects of spontaneously emerging sensitive
desires and aversions being unable to be willed until they are subsumed
under some intelligible order. He adds, “intelligible orders are linked
with one another in mutual dependence, or as condition and conditioned,
or as part and whole; and prior to becoming engaged of one’s own choice,
one already is engaged in the process by the fact of one’s desires and aversions, by one’s intelligent grasp of the intelligible orders under which they
can be satisfied, and by one’s self-consciousness of oneself as an actually
rational knower and a potentially rational doer.”41 Emergent within one’s
moral awareness is a demand for “the penetrating, honest, complete consistency that alone meets the requirements of the detached, disinterested,
37. See 3 BERNARD LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,
621 (Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, eds., 1992).
38. BERNARD LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY, 134 (1972).
39. Lonergan, supra note 37, at 624.
40. Id. at 625.
41. Id.
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unrestricted desire to know.”42 Such consistency, Lonergan insists,
“means consistent terminal objects” that are genuine and unbiased to be
chosen and acted upon. As Lonergan goes on to say,
If the terminal objects are to be consistent, then there is no room
for choosing the part and repudiating the whole, for choosing
the conditioned and repudiating the condition, for choosing the
antecedent and repudiating the consequent. Finally, intelligible
orders include concrete objects of desire and exclude concrete
objects of aversion, and so from the dynamic exigence of rational
self-consciousness, by the simple process of asking what in fact
that exigence concretely is, there can be determined a body of
ethical principles.43
When one moves, as Finnis did, from the perspective of Insight to that
of Method in Theology, it is correct to note, as Finnis also did, a certain seachange in Lonergan’s thought. In an interview held at the 1970 Florida
conference in his honor Lonergan spoke of a “spreading out, moving on,
including more” after the publication of Insight in 1957. He mentioned
realizing (with the help of Robert Sokolowski’s work on Husserl) that he
had been pursuing intentionality analysis, and that he was now able to
drop the language of faculty psychology in which he was still expressing
himself in Insight. He spoke of “reading von Hildebrand and Frings’ book
on Scheler” in the effort to meet further questions of his own. (“One also
has feelings oneself, too, you know.”) By the time of his 1968 Aquinas
Lecture at Marquette University on “The Subject,” he had made the breakthrough beyond the transcendental notion of being that prevailed in Insight to the “transcendental notion of value” that was pervasive throughout
Method in Theology (1972). As Lonergan wrote in “Insight Revisited,”
In Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method
the good is a distinct notion. It is intended as questions for deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It
is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is
known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic
person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding
and living up to one’s decisions. Just as intelligence sublates
sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation
sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling.44
Along with Lonergan’s shift from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis already mentioned, the explicitation of the transcendental notion of
value was also a crucial factor in the transition to his position in Method in
Theology.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 625–26.
44. Bernard Lonergan, INSIGHT REVISITED, A Second Collection, supra note
18, at 277.
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Lonergan’s integration of the idea of “sublation” into his account of
cognitional structure also must be highlighted, because it is integral for
the transition from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis: “I would
use this notion in Karl Rahner’s sense rather than Hegel’s to mean that
what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and
distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the
sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all
its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller
realization within a richer context.”45 Sublation plays an important role in
Lonergan’s mature account of judgments of value, as we see in what
follows.
In Method in Theology values are equivalent not with satisfactions but
with true goods on levels that Lonergan names vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious. Knowing values occurs on the level of responsible or
existential consciousness when, in relation to situations calling for action,
we ask, “What should I/we do?” and “Should I/we do it?” The question of
value asks neither about the intelligibility (when, where, what, why, how)
nor the truth (Is it so? or What happens to be the case?) of the situation in
which a decision or action is required. If we do not already have a correct
understanding of the situation because of a prior process of asking and
answering questions, then we would need to go back and understand the
intelligibility and judge the truth of the situation before we could properly
ask the question about what to do (the question of value). Again, as soon
we know about any situation and start asking about what we should do, we
experience feelings in relation to the correctly known situation. Lonergan
calls the relevant feelings “‘intentional responses to values”.46 So what we
speak of as a “situation” will always be regarded as a concrete instance of
the “human good,” because we discern values in relation to the structured
human good, i.e., the concrete and cumulative result of past acts of
human understanding, judging, deciding, and acting in the world. Depending on what kind of person we are, and so on what our identity, orientation and horizon happens to be, our responses will be more or less
expansive and adequate. Let me illustrate what this means.
Little kids’ feelings rarely transcend the level of needs and capacities,
i.e., the level of particular goods. Later, less mature people tend to be
chiefly concerned with the vital values of health, physical beauty, grace,
and coordinated movement, but of course everyone has to be concerned
with these matters to some degree. Then, as and if we mature, our feelings
about particular goods become increasingly aware of them in relation to
goods of order, such as systems of law, economy, governance, education, and
so on. At the same time there is growth in the awareness that most of what
we do involves acts of cooperation within the already understood and
agreed upon frameworks of cooperation that we call institutions, such as
45. LONERGAN, supra note 38, at 241.
46. See id. at 30–31, 38, 58.
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the family and home, school, sports, work, commerce, the professions, and
government, etc. These institutional frameworks embody social values,
about which we have more or less definite feelings. When and if, furthermore, we reach the maturity of grown-ups (keeping in mind that while we
have to grow older, we can always be immature), our feelings become capable of assessing different goods of order (e.g., a free market economy vs.
a socialist economy) in relation to even more profoundly felt cultural, personal, and religious values. Because these values are, as Aristotle would say,
‘that for-the-sake-of-which’ particular goods and goods of order are chosen, these values function as terminal values, and are correlative to the individual and collective choosers, who become originative values when they
choose well. So it is that what Lonergan called intentional responses to
values play into the apprehensions and judgments of value that concretely
pertain to the structure of the human good, even when individuals and
groups are not explicitly aware that this is so.
By way of reviewing how Lonergan thought about the structure of
attaining judgments of value, decisions, and actions, we start when any
situation more or less adequately understood and judged as to “the facts”
gives rise to questions about what to do. These are questions of value.
Once we enter ethical space,47 there comes into play McCabe’s distinction
between what is to be done and myself as the person who either can or
cannot choose one determinate course of action or another.
In the process of deliberation or discernment, one first asks questions
aimed at understanding the value of objectively available alternative
courses of action: What should I do? One arrives at responses to this question through affective insights attained by feelings as intentional responses
to value. To take an example, a CEO of a “bank too big to fail” knows that
risky business transactions in the past have created havoc in the financial
sector, but also knows the profits gained when such ventures are successful, so what should he/she do in the future? Here, let me note that affective apprehensions need not forsake the use of intelligence in seeking a
possibly choice-worthy course of action nor need affective insights be necessarily irrational, although persons are free to let them be governed by
the motto of Gordon Gecko in the Wall Street film, “Greed is good.”
Once a possible course of action strikes a person or a group as the
right thing to do, then the further question arises: Should I/we do this?
In response, this reflective query places the possible course of action in the
context of the relevant goods of order that operate as the whole in relation to which the object of choice is a part. If the part fits intelligently,
reasonably, and responsibly into the whole orientation of our living and to
the whole way of life already believed to be good, then we make a responsible judgment of value: I/We ought to do this. A responsible judgment
47. For Lonergan on “ethical space,” see Bernard Lonergan, Self-transcendence:
Intellectual, Moral, Religious, in 17 COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN, supra
note 4, at 313, 322–25.
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grounds good rather than evil decisions. Such decisions ordinarily involve
a horizontal exercise of liberty.
Here, therefore, a significant additional dimension arises in Lonergan’s later way of speaking about practical judgment, namely, the distinction between a horizontal and a vertical exercise of liberty, which he
learned from his distinguished colleague in the Philosophy Faculty at the
Gregorian University, Joseph de Finance.
Horizontal liberty is the exercise of liberty within a determinate horizon and from the basis of a corresponding existential
stance. Vertical liberty is the exercise of liberty that selects that
stance and the corresponding horizon. Such vertical liberty may
be implicit: it occurs in responding to the motives that lead one
to ever fuller authenticity, or in ignoring such motives and drifting into an ever less authentic selfhood. But it can also be explicit. Then one is responding to the transcendental notion of
value, by determining what it would be worthwhile for one to
make of oneself, and what it would be worthwhile to do for one’s
fellow men. One works out an ideal of human reality and
achievement, and to that ideal one dedicates oneself. As one’s
knowledge increases, as one’s experience is enriched, as one’s
reach is strengthened or weakened, one’s ideal may be revised,
and the revision may recur many times.
In such vertical liberty, whether implicit or explicit, are to be
found the foundations of the judgments of value that occur.
Such judgments are felt to be true or false in so far as they generate a peaceful or uneasy conscience. But they attain their proper
context, their clarity and refinement, only through man’s historical development and the individual’s personal appropriation of
his social, cultural, and religious heritage. It is by the transcendental notion of value and its exigencies in a good and uneasy
conscience that man can develop morally. But a rounded moral
judgment is ever the work of a fully developed self-transcending
subject or, as Aristotle would put it, a virtuous man.48
And so according to Lonergan, practical reflection, besides assessing
how a possible course of action fits into relevant goods of order, also evaluates the possible course of action in relation to the terminal values that are
vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious (as set forth in Method in Theology).49 These values orient our living across the board. This is why our
free decisions about values require a vertical exercise of liberty. We have to
decide to implement the course of action, even though we also are always
48. LONERGAN, supra note 38, 40–41, where at footnote 13 there is a reference
to Joseph de Finance, Essai sur l’agir humain 287 (Presses de l’Université
Grégorienne 1962).
49. LONERGAN, supra note 38, at 31–32.
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free not to follow through. However, if we choose to perform something
other than the intelligent, reasonable, and responsible course of action,
we choose a bad or evil course; or if we choose not to decide but simply to
drift, that is also a decision. A good action will be the freely chosen execution or performance that constitutes the best possible course of action as
actual or real. In almost every case our action will also be an instance of
cooperation within the concrete framework of the human good.
I hope it is clear why even in Lonergan’s later philosophy of action his
emphasis on the role of feelings cannot be equated with the modern voluntarism-cum-utilitarianism of someone like Hobbes, for whom the decision of the will—far from being intelligent, reasonable, and responsible—
is no more than the last in the series of emotional impulses that precedes
one’s acting, and for whom intelligence or reason is no more than a calculating faculty in the service of the arbitrary will and the subject’s exclusively self-regarding feelings. I also hope that the relationship of
presupposition and complementarity among the vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values makes manifest that Lonergan’s manner of
speaking about the way goods of order function within the structure of the
human good in our practical reasoning is irreducible to any utilitarian
calculus. When Hobbes replaced the summum bonum of classical philosophy and theology with the summum malum—the fear of violent death—and
when Locke turned Hobbesian self-preservation as the basis for civil society into comfortable self-preservation (i.e., life, liberty—as freedom from
coercion—and the protection of man’s estate or property), these thinkers
effectually made the higher cultural, personal, and religious values subservient to the lower vital and social values. Lonergan, on the other hand,
conceived of the hierarchy of values in such a way that lower values condition and enable the higher values, while at the same time they exist for the
sake of the higher values; and the higher values should determine the
intelligibility, reasonableness, and responsibility of the lower ones. Indeed, I think Lonergan’s normative scale of values would be quite compatible with Finnis’s list of indispensable basic goods, and that list (with some
modifications, perhaps) could help to clarify the meaning of the normative scale of values.
V.

CONCLUSION

As a philosopher of law and ethics, John Finnis provided a rational
basis for orienting praxis in the political, legal, and ethical spheres of
human living towards the common good. I think that Lonergan would
find Finnis’s aim and his achievement praiseworthy, perhaps most of all in
its repudiation of the most common errors in current legal and ethical
philosophy. It remains that in their common concerns their approaches
differ vastly in their emphases, if not in their basic conclusions about the
good. Apart from points already mentioned, perhaps the main reason for
this divergence in emphasis is to do with the fact that both Insight and
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Method resulted from Lonergan’s life-long dedication to a project of foundational methodology for the sake of the renewal of Catholic theology.
Until the completion of Insight, Lonergan was under the tutelage of
Thomas Aquinas. While greatly influenced by Aquinas’s invention of theology as a science on the model of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Lonergan
was convinced that St. Thomas’s chief achievement was to “fuse a phenomenology of the subject with a psychology of the soul.”50 During those years
Lonergan took for granted the scholastic tag nihil amatum nisi prius cognitum, laboring to bring the genius of Aquinas as he had appropriated it in
his historical studies of the theology of operative grace and the procession
of the verbum in the context of Trinitarian theology to bear on the challenges modern science and modern historical consciousness posed for
Catholic thought. But deeper involvement in the problems of theological
method led him to become more Augustinian in his later years. If he operated under the auspices of Aquinas’s teaching on the natural desire for
essential knowledge of God in the first period, in the later period Lonergan was deeply struck by the reality indicated by Augustine’s statement,
“pondus meum amor meus, eo feror quocumque feror.”51 In its light he understood Pascal’s famous statement about the heart’s reasons, without agreeing with voluntarist and irrationalist and fideist interpretations of Pascal’s
premises for that statement.52 Once he realized that the outpouring of
God’s love into our hearts that is the Holy Spirit (Rom. 5:5) was not the
unique exception to the scholastic assumption about the priority of knowledge over love, he also understood that the priority of the heart’s reasons
also applies to every instance of authentic falling-in-love.
Having comprehended the priority of love, there emerged Lonergan’s late exploration of the two concrete vectors of human development:
There is development from below upwards, from experience to
growing understanding, from growing understanding to balanced judgment, from balanced judgment to fruitful courses of
action, and from fruitful courses of action to the new situations
that call forth further understanding, profounder judgment,
richer courses of action.
But there also is development from above downwards.
There is the transformation of falling in love: the domestic love
of the family; the human love of one’s tribe, one’s city, one’s
country, mankind; the divine love that orientates man in his cos50. See Bernard Lonergan, Introduction: Subject and Soul, in VERBUM, 3–11.
This new Introduction was written when Lonergan consented to have the articles
that first appeared in Theological Studies published in a book edition and to be
translated into French.
51. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS, 13. 9. 10: “pondus meum amor meus, eo feror
quocumque feror,” which Henry Chadwick rendered “My weight is my love. Wherever
I am carried, my love is carrying me.” AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 278 (Henry Chadwick trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
52. LONERGAN, supra note 38, at 115, 261, 341.
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mos and expresses itself in his worship. Where hatred only sees
evil, loves reveals value. At once it commands commitment and
joyfully carries it out, no matter what the sacrifice involved.
Where hatred reinforces bias, love dissolves it, whether it be the
bias of unconscious motivation, the bias of individual or group
egoism, or the bias of omnicompetent, short-sighted common
sense. Where hatred plods around in ever narrower circles, love
breaks the bonds of psychological and social determinisms with
the conviction of faith and the power of hope.53
I would say that the interplay of these two developmental vectors discloses the ontological structure of the hermeneutic circle. Prior to all our
actions and sufferings, there is the way of heritage from above downwards,
operating through love’s influence on one’s decisions, judgments, understandings, and experiential perceptions. Lonergan provided a concrete
illustration of one way this above-downwards influence works:
It begins in the affectivity of the infant, the child, the son, the
pupil, the follower. On affectivity rests the apprehension of values. On the apprehension of values rests belief. On belief follows the growth in understanding of one who has found a
genuine teacher and has been initiated into the study of the masters of the past. Then to confirm one’s growth in understanding
comes experience made mature and perceptive by one’s developed understanding. With experiential confirmation the inverse
process may set in. One now is on one’s own. One can appropriate all one has learnt by proceeding, as does the original thinker
who moved from experience to understanding, to sound judgment, to generous evaluation, to commitment in love, loyalty,
faith.54
Devoted from the beginning to intellectual probity and dismayed by
much modern Catholic theology, Lonergan had emphasized the way from
below upwards almost at the expense of the way from above downwards.
Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy confirmed both his Catholic sense
that the Enlightenment ‘prejudice against prejudice’ (that had debunked
the cognitional significance of belief in relation to shared knowledge) relegated the hermeneutic circle’s way from above downwards to oblivion,
and confirmed his recognition that intellectual development inevitably
proceeds in a rhythm of believing to understand and understanding to
believe, so that Neo-scholastic rationalism was routed at last, without any
sacrifice of truth’s objectivity, on the condition that truth is the fruit of
authentic subjectivity.
53. Bernard Lonergan, Healing and Creating in History, in A THIRD COLLECPAPERS BY BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN 106 (Frederick E. Crowe ed., 1985).
54. See LONERGAN, Natural Right and Historical Mindedness, in A THIRD COLLECTION: PAPERS BY BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, supra note 53, at 181.
TION:
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The way of achievement, working from below upwards, from experiencing through insight and formulation, critical understanding and judgment, to evaluation, decision, commitment, and love unfolds in response
to the way of heritage.55 Moreover, in accord with the demands of the
integral hermeneutic circle, Lonergan argued, philosophy can only be
comprehensive in its reflection on the human condition if (knowingly or
not) it is grounded upon, or at least open to, religious being-in-love with
God.
As it becomes more comprehensive in its fidelity to the ongoing enactment of the integral hermeneutic circle, philosophy cannot avoid facing the theological issues of good and evil, redemption and sin, and both
the offer of grace and its rejection. This brings with it the realization that
what Insight championed as the “appropriation of one’s own rational selfconsciousness” not only really involved an “intellectual conversion,”56 but
that normally intellectual conversion57 demands a prior and distinct
moral conversion from satisfactions to true values or the good,58 and that
this in turn is almost always only made possible by a prior religious conversion—Augustine’s point.59
Here, perhaps, the vocational difference between the two thinkers
comes to a head. Finnis sets forth magisterial arguments in legal philosophy and ethics. But, but while he superbly presents as cogently as is humanly possible what ought to be, he is not as strong when it comes
explaining the becoming of the human. Since our meeting, and after
reading the chapter in Aquinas to which he referred in his response to my
paper, it has occurred to me that Finnis always honors his readers and
interlocutors by speaking to them as if they were already religiously, morally, and intellectually converted. In other words, as a philosopher he
prescinds from the “reign of sin” or as Lonergan translated this Pauline
expression, “the probability of sin.” To my knowledge, Finnis has not theorized about either the need for, or the reality of, religious conversion. In
contrast, Lonergan insisted that religious conversion is the normal condition of the actuality of moral and intellectual conversion,60 which, it might
be supposed, would be required fully to be convinced by Finnis’s
arguments.
55. The first to reflect on the significance of the two ways for the development
of Lonergan’s thought was Frederick E. Crowe. See Frederick E. Crowe, An Expansion of Lonergan’s Notion of Value, in APPROPRIATING THE LONERGAN IDEA, 344–59
(Michael Vertin ed., 1989). For a fuller treatment see Muhigirwa F. Rusembuka,
THE TWO WAYS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ACCORDING TO B. LONERGAN: ANTICIPATION IN INSIGHT 17 (Editrice Pontificia Gregoriana 2001).
56. See Bernard Lonergan, Cognitional Structure, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF
BERNARD LONERGAN, supra note 4, at 205, 219.
57. LONERGAN, supra note 38, at 241–43.
58. Id. at 240–43.
59. Id. at 318, 338.
60. Id. at 122, 243.
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Now Christians believe that religious conversion is brought about by
the gift of God’s love, i.e., grace. Thomas Aquinas’s theology of grace,
which was the topic of Lonergan’s doctoral dissertation, resulted from
thinking through the relationships between God’s gift of his grace and
acts of human knowing and freely willing in a way that had not been
achieved ever since the doctrinal issues had been staked out by St. Augustine in his debates with the Pelagians and adopted as church doctrines at
the Council of Orange. According to Thomas’s account of the natural
structure of human action (which is the topic of the third chapter of Finnis’s Aquinas), the relationships between human judgment regarding the
end of action and the will of the end, which proceeds as an intelligible
emanation from the intellect into the will and does not involve free choice
(electio), normally sets the conditions for the deliberation that leads to
both the judgment regarding the means to the end, and the free decision
that selects and commands the execution of the right means. In Christian
conversion—the occurrence of God’s replacement of “the heart of stone”
with “the heart of flesh” in Ezekiel’s description (36:26)—God changes
the will of the end, so that the will is not moving but moved. (In technical
terms this is the operative grace of conversion,61 and the infusion of the
habit of sanctifying grace). This enables human beings to respond by cooperating with God’s grace. In Lonergan’s transposition of Aquinas in
Method in Theology, this is the intervention of the gift of God’s love, by
which human beings fall in love with God and enter into the state of being-in-love with God. In either case—i.e., either of falling in love with God
or of being faithful in response to that love—the grace of conversion is not
a product of human knowledge and choice. As suggested above, Lonergan realized that this is analogous to all human falling in love and being in
love. In this way he became convinced that love is what moves and channels authentic human action. The idea reminds us of Aristotle’s remark
that, given the love of friendship, one does not have to worry about justice;
and also that in the case of rightly ordered self-love presupposed by philia
(the love of friendship), love’s feelings not only are not irrational, but also
they enable the lover’s ongoing development from above downwards. So,
to my mind, the possibility of the reality about which Finnis rhetorically
inquires in his lovely response to my paper suggests that he agrees: “May
not [Shakespeare’s] ‘Love hath Reason’ be compatible with and perhaps
even affirm the position that love of persons, each precisely for his or her
own sake, has the reasons which the first practical principles pick out, the
human goods towards which those principles direct us, each of these
goods an aspect of the worth (in deprivation or fulfilment) of each human
being?”
61. See BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, GRACE AND FREEDOM 102–03 (J. Patout Burns
ed., 1971) on how Thomas understood operative grace as actual as changing a
person’s “will of the end” that could not be changed by the person’s own knowing
or willing; and then actual grace becomes cooperative in every instance of willing
means in accord with the new, supernatural end.
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